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Abstract
This paper develops an intra-industry model of trade with heterogeneous rms to
investigate the impact of trade on the evolution of within rm productivity. The main
contribution is to incorporate endogenous labor productivity gains. Heterogeneous rms
have di¤erent incentives to invest in foreign technology which in turns enhances e¢ ciency
heterogeneously. Trade liberalization reduces the price of imported capital equipment
and increases factor demands. These mechanisms introduce two novel results. First,
aggregate productivity increases due to within-rm productivity improvements. Second,
tari¤s reduction has little impact on the extensive margin of trade in countries already
highly open.
Keywords: trade liberalization, rm heterogeneity, endogenous productivity gains,
extensive margin of trade.
JEL Classication: F10, F12 and F41
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1 Introduction
Empirical works at the rm level have shown that trade policy shapes the evolution of rm
productivity. This "within-rm" e¤ect of trade, however, can not be reproduced by the
wave of the recent heterogeneous rmsmodels. In these models, trade induces aggregate
productivity improvements as a consequence of the exit of the least productive rms and
the reallocation of market shares towards the most productive ones. This "between-rm"
e¤ect of trade is in line with stylized facts provided by rm-level data. Nonetheless,
the understanding of the e¤ect of trade on productivity calls for further analysis on the
mechanisms explaining rms productivity improvements.
This paper investigates the relationship between trade liberalization, technology in-
vestment and productivity gains at the rm level. We focus on developing economies,
usually characterized as highly dependent on foreign technology. We propose an exten-
sion of Melitz (2003) incorporating endogenous labor productivity gains determined by an
initial investment in technologies embodied in imported capital goods. While we assume
an exogenous initial distribution of productivity levels, we allow for further modications
of the initial level as a consequence of rmsdecisions. The main contributions of this
paper to the existing literature can be resumed as follows. Firstly, the model allows for en-
dogenous productivity gains. Thereby, it explains how trade policy shapes the incentives
of rms to undertake investments to enhance their productivity gains, a topic that has
received fewer attention in the existing theoretical literature of trade with heterogeneous
rms. Secondly, the model sheds some new light on the impact of trade liberalization
on the intensive (volume of exports) and the extensive margin of trade (number of new
exporters). Actually, rms productivity improvements are themselves heterogeneous.
Initial productivity matters and self-selection mechanisms are emphasized. The result is
that gains of trade are concentrated on a reduced number of exporters.
Several empirical works have studied the impact of trade integration on industry pro-
ductivity evolution. One of their contributions is to understand whether trade liber-
alization inuences aggregate productivity and by which mechanisms. By decomposing
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aggregate productivity (see Olley and Pakes, 1996; Foster, Haltiwanger and Krizan, 1998),
these studies have stressed three main channels : (1) Resources reallocation towards most
productive rms (between-rm channel), (2) Net entry and (3) Improvements of rms
e¢ ciency (within-rm channel). In general, these works use plant panel data to carry
out study cases of countries which have experienced trade reforms. Results vary across
countries and industries.
Pavcnik (2002) investigates the impact of trade liberalization on rm productivity in
Chile (1979-1986). In her aggregate productivity decomposition, a major role is played by
the reallocation process of inputs and production towards most productive rms. Bernard
and Jensen (2001) estimate the determinants of aggregate productivity at the industry
level in the US (1983-1992) and nd similar results. In both studies, productivity im-
provements at the industry level are mainly explained by the between-rm channel.
On the other hand, other empirical works highlight the explanatory power of within-
rm productivity improvements and the net-entry of more productive rms: Aw, Chung
and Roberts (2000) on Taiwan (1986-1991); Treer (2000) on Canada, De Loecker and
Konings (2005) on Slovenia (1994-2000), Bergoeing, Hernando and Repetto (2006) on
Chile (1979-2001) and Bas and Ledezma (2007) on Chile (1979-1999). These studies
conrm that rm productivity evolves over the time and that this evolution is a key
factor to explain aggregate levels.
Interestingly, concerning recent empirical works on Chile, one notes that the sample
periods are larger than the one used by Pavcnik (2002). Using di¤erent estimates of
rm productivity, both Bergoeing, Hernando and Repetto (2006) and Bas and Ledezma
(2007) nd that between 1979 and 1986 aggregate productivity is mostly explained by the
reallocation process. Nevertheless, these studies show that the evolution of within-rm
productivity plays an important role from 1986 to 1998, the same period in which Chile
experienced stable macroeconomic growth. This result is illustrated by Figure 1.a. It
depicts the ratio of the weighted average labor productivity to the simple average (un-
weighted). While the former reects average productivity gains arising from reallocation
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of resources, the latter relates to within-rm productivity improvements. In Figure 1.b.,
we overlap the histogram of plant productivity of 1987 with the one of 1995, a period of
within-rm productivity gains. First, we observe that distribution remains highly asym-
metric. Since we only observe those rms that remain in the market, the reduction in the
percentage at the lowest productivity levels reects the exit of least productive ones (both
histograms start at zero). Second, it is important to note that productivity improvements
concern a much reduced number of plants (histogram for 1995 in gray). Thus, productivity
improvements at the rm level are heterogeneous and concern just a few rms.
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On the theoretical ground, after the pioneer works of Melitz (2003) and Bernard,
Eaton, Jensen and Kortum (2003), several trade models have been developed based on
a microeconomic setup with heterogeneous productivity levels across rms. This theo-
retical framework is able to reproduce the between-rm e¤ect of aggregate productivity
improvements. The reduction of trade frictions enhances aggregate productivity through
two mechanisms. The increase in real wages and foreign competition leads to a reduction
of domestic market shares of all rms and, thereby, the exit of the least productive ones.
Consequently, there is also a reallocation process of resources towards the most productive
rms, namely exporters.The second channel is characterized by the raise in market shares
of exporters due to the increase in foreign demand.
An interesting contribution is the one of Baldwin and Robert-Nicoud (2008), which
incorporates an innovative sector in the Melitzs model to explain the e¤ects of trade
on aggregate productivity growth. They combine the framework of heterogeneous rms
with the endogenous growth theory. Dynamic e¤ects are introduced thanks to knowl-
edge spillovers associated to the production of successful varieties. In their model, trade
liberalization has two opposite e¤ects on economic growth. The positive e¤ect is based
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on the reduction of the marginal cost of innovation. Nevertheless, the selection of the
most productive rms in the domestic market, generated by trade openness, increases the
expected cost of production of new varieties and reduces the growth rate. The impact of
trade on aggregate productivity is di¤erent depending on whether one focuses on static
or dynamic e¤ects. After trade liberalization, industry productivity raises in level but the
growth rate might decrease.
A key assumption of these models is that productivity at the rm level is exogenous.
Therefore, they are not able to explain the evolution of industry productivity related to
within-rm channels. Firm productivity is exogenously determined and it remains un-
changed. This is a key issue motivating this paper. While several theoretical works have
explained why only the most productive producers can export and how trade induces
a market share reallocation process, the determinants of these productivity di¤erentials
have not received enough attention. We contribute to this issue by introducing an en-
dogenous mechanism of productivity divergence across rms which is reinforced by trade
liberalization.
In that sense our model is related to Yeaple (2005) who introduces a discrete technolog-
ical choice. Firm heterogeneity arises endogenously from the allocation of heterogeneous
skilled workers to di¤erent technologies. Homogeneous rms become heterogeneous due
to the availability of more skilled workers. While Yeaple (2005) develops an explanation
of rm heterogeneity, the static setup of his model does not allow for rmsdecisions
seeking to change their initial productivity. In this model, productivity improvements
due to technology adoption are homogeneous. In this paper, we represent technological
choice as a continuous decision of the initial level of capital investment, which contributes
to improve the productivity of a homogenous labour factor. While we assume an initial
level of heterogeneity, we endogenously explain the change in the distribution of rms
productivity.
The setup of our model is as follow. We keep the intra-industry monopolistic com-
petition framework with (initially) heterogeneous rms and introduce an investment in
7
technology embodied in imported capital goods. Once rms have paid a xed-sunk entry
cost, their initial productivity level is revealed. Afterwards, depending on their prof-
itability, rms have the possibility to improve even more their e¢ ciency through capital
investment. Since the initial level of productivity is heterogenous across rms, the produc-
tivity gains coming from capital-labor substitution are also heterogeneous across rms.
Trade policy is represented by xed export costs and variable trade costs. The latter
includes tari¤s of imported capital goods. As usually, only most productive producers are
able to pay the xed export cost and to reach the foreign market. Trade liberalization
a¤ects rms investment decisions on both the supply and the demand sides. On the
supply side, a decrease in tari¤s of imported capital goods implies a heterogeneous increase
in capital-labor substitution. On the demand side, the reduction of variable trade costs
enhances foreign demand of domestic producers. The anticipation of a greater demand
also increases heterogeneously capital investment because producers know the impact of
their investment on prices and prots. The role of monopolistic competition is crucial
to create the demand channel. Firms not only set a mark-up over marginal costs, but
they can also reduce their marginal costs depending on their productivity advantages
relative to the economy. As in a Dixit-Stiglitz framework, each rm competes with the
whole economy. Most productive rms boost up the average productivity of the economy
and deter the least productive ones to undertake technology investments. At the end,
trade liberalization is biased towards the initially high-productivity rms that become
even more e¢ cient after trade liberalization. This theoretical prediction is consistent
with the empirical ndings presented by Aw, Chung and Roberts (2000), Treer (2004),
De Loecker and Konings (2005), Bergoeing, Hernando and Repetto (2006) and Bas and
Ledezma (2007).
Hence, both "between" and "within" mechanisms are present in this model to explain
how the trade frictions reduction contributes positively to aggregate productivity. The
between-rm e¤ect works through the standard selection channel in the domestic mar-
ket. The novel within-rm channel is interesting because productivity improvements are
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heterogenous across rms. Indeed, the model predicts that only a small fraction of rms
will become more e¢ cient after a reduction of trade costs. Hence, the initial distribution
of productivity is modied. Initially high-productive rms capture most of technological
productivity improvements. This result explains why there is a minor change in the ex-
tensive margin of trade since gains from trade are concentrated in the most productive
rms, those that more likely already export.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 the set-up of the model is
presented. Section 3 develops the main results. Section 4 concludes.
2 The model
2.1 Households consumption
There are two countries: home h and foreign f: They represent two small open economies.
Households allocate consumption between the set of available domestic varieties 
h and
the imported one 
xf . Both sets are endogenously determined by the entry and the exit
of rms. Whether domestic varieties are exported or not depends on their protability.
Consumerspreferences across varieties are given by a standard CES utility function. All
variables with an circle () represent the foreign market and all round brackets () are
reserved to specify the arguments of functions. Let Ch be the aggregate CES index in the
home country. Domestic preferences are then summarized by:
Ch =
"Z
i2
h
dh(i)
 1
 di+
Z
i02
xf
df (i
0)
 1
 di0
# 
 1
(1)
Where dh (i) and df (i0) are the consumption of home and foreign varieties, respectively.
The elasticity of substitution,  > 1; is the same in both countries. Denoting px (i) the
price of variety (i) produced in country x and Ph the aggregate price in the home country,
this formulation implies the following optimal inverse demand functions:
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dh (i) =

Ph
ph (i)

Ch (2)
df (i
0) =
"
Ph
pf (i0) [1 +  ] e
#
Ch (3)
Where e is the nominal exchange rate quoted in the home currency relative to the
foreign one and  the variable trade costs, modeled as "iceberg costs". Consequently, the
CES price index is given by:
Ph =
"Z
i2
h
ph (i)
1  di+
Z
i02
xf

pf (i
0) [1 +  ] e
1 
di
0
# 1
1 
(4)
2.2 Producers
Each rm i faces the following schedule. First it enters the market. To do so, before
knowing its initial productivity level, h (i) ; the rm has to pay a start-up cost fe. After
paying this sunk entry cost, h (i) is revealed from a common distribution density g(h);
with support [0;1] and cumulative distribution G(h). Second, once the rm knows its
initial productivity level, but still before production, it decides its investment in technol-
ogy embodied in imported capital goods. This technology choice allows it to improve its
initial level of productivity. Finally, due to the presence of a xed production cost f paid
at every period, the rm decides whether it stays or exits the market. It might be the
case that, even if a rm invests to enhance its e¢ ciency, the expected protability is not
high enough to produce. In that case, the rm exits the market. Otherwise it stays and
produces with an improved productivity level until economic conditions change and its
revenues become insu¢ cient to pay the permanent xed cost.
Firms enter the market if their expected value allows, at least, to pay the entry cost.
Thus, they anticipate their expected discounted of prots. This also includes the expected
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gains from investment. We then analyze each step of the schedule and solve the model in
backward induction.
2.2.1 Technology
Producers compete within a monopolistic competition framework. When a rm is active
in the market, it produces a specic variety by using labor with constant returns to scale.
Focusing on the home country, the production function Yh (i) of producer i is given by:
Yh (i) = Ah (i) lh (i) (5)
Labor productivityAh (i) depends on an initial investment in foreign technology Ih0 (i).
This investment has a di¤erent impact depending on the initial productivity level of each
rm h (i).
Ah (i) = h (i) [Ih0 (i)]
 (6)
Where 0 <  < 1. The technology choice of rm i is made once it knows its initial
productivity level h (i) and before it starts producing. This initial investment represents
a specic xed technological cost incurred by the rm in order to improve its e¢ ciency
when it enters the market. If it decides to stay, the rm produces using only labor with
constant returns to scale, but with an improved productivity level.
Thus, the rms investment Ih0 is a decision, which is endogenously determined in the
model. Since this decision depends on the heterogeneity h, the level of investment will
be heterogeneous across rms. Firms endowed with a higher initial productivity level,
will be able to reinforce even more their e¢ ciency through an investment channel.
As we focus on developing economies, we think in technology as embodied in imported
capital goods. The elasticity ; which is homogeneous across rms, captures the extent
to which labor productivity reacts to this type of technology in the industry. If  = 0
one nds a Melitz-type model. If  > 0 further decisions take place and, as we will
see, the initial distribution of productivity is modied. In this sense, the model seeks to
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understand the evolution of rm productivity in capital intensive industries.
One key assumption is that capital goods are supplied to both countries by the rest
of the world in perfect competition. Implicitly, the model considers two small economies
and a third country that represents the rest of the world. Since the investment is paid
with prots, the trade balance condition between the two small economies does not take
into account imported capital goods. Thus, we solve the model for the partial equilibrium
between these two small economies.
2.2.2 Price setting and prots
As we mentioned, during production, rms behave as if they have constant returns on
labor with a given level of productivity. Hence, rst order conditions imply that rm set
prices as a mark-up over marginal costs (wages over labor productivity):
ph (i) =

[  1]
Wh
Ah (i)
(7)
Where Wh is the wage rate in the home country. The price of home goods sold in the
foreign markets ph is higher due to variable trade costs (represented by ).
ph (i) =

[  1]
Wh
Ah (i)
[1 +  ]
e
(8)
Assumption 1: Countries h and f are symmetric.
We can now simplify our notation. Assumption 1 ensures equal wage rates (normalized
to 1: Wh = Wf = 1) and equal aggregate prices (Ph = eP f = P ). Then, hereafter we
drop country subscripts. Since heterogeneity is totally captured by ; we also drop rm
subscripts and identify rms by .
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Firmsrevenues can be divided into those earned from domestic sales rd and those
earned from export sales rx. Using (7) and (6) the former can be written as:
rd (I0) =

P
p (I0)
 1
R (9)
Where R is the aggregate revenue of the country (R = PC). We write revenues as a
function of the initial investment in order to highlight the decision schedule. Using (8),
export revenues are given by:
rx (I0) = rd (I0) [1 +  ]
1  (10)
Total revenue r (I0) of a rm with initial productivity  depends on its export status:
r (I0) = rd (I0) if the rm does not export
r (I0) = rd (I0) + rx (I0) = rd (I0)
h
1 + (1 + )1 
i
if the rm exports
Similarly, prots can also be divided into domestic prots d (I0) and export prots
x (I0):
d (I0) =
rd (I0)

   () I0   f (11)
Where f represents xed production costs that are paid in every period. We assume
that technology investment is paid with prots to the country supplying capital goods
(the rest of the world).  () I0 is the amortized investment.  ()  (1 + ) pkew is
the nal price of imported capital in home currency. ew is the nominal exchange rate
between any of the two symmetric small economies and the rest of the world. The price
of imported capital goods pk is taken as given since both economies are supposed to be
small enough to have any impact on world prices. Export prots x (I0) =
rx(I0)

  fx
are then:
x (I0) =
rd (I0)

(1 + )1    fx (12)
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Firms having a higher productivity, which depends on the initial technology invest-
ment, will charge a lower price, have a higher demand and earn higher prots than less
productive ones.
2.3 Technology choice: Initial investment
Using backward induction, rms set optimal prices taking I0 as given (equations (7) and
(8) ) and decide the level of I0 that maximizes the present value v of their domestic prots:
Using  as the time discounting factor.1
v (I0) =
1

rd (I0)

  I0 ()  f (13)
The rst order condition implies an optimal investment which depends on the initial
productivity:
I0 () = [P]
 1

(
R
 ()

  1

) 1
(14)
Where   1   (  1). We assume that 1
( 1) >  in order to ensure non-explosive
returns of investment. The power  1

gives the concavity of the e¤ect of  on rms
investment. This term comes from the fact that, when maximizing the discounted value
of prots ows, the e¤ect of demand is taken into account twice. First, when setting their
price, rms know that their demand is a decreasing function of their price relative to the
aggregate one. This leads to the mark-up price rule. Second, when entering the market
they also know that their demand can be enhanced by decreasing their marginal costs
through the investment channel. As we will see this anticipation mechanism implies that
the e¤ect of the initial heterogeneity is not linear.
1As in Melitz (2003), the time discounting parametter ; represents also the exogenous probaility of
exit.
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2.4 Thresholds of production and export status
Since there is a xed production cost (paid in units of labor), there exists a marginal rm,
; whose domestic prots are equal to zero: d () = 0: This is equivalent to state:
rId (
)

= f (15)
Where rId ()  rd ()  I0 () () are domestic revenues net of amortization of initial
investment in technology. The value  is the production cuto¤. It denes the threshold
corresponding to the minimum level of productivity that allows to produce. Some rms
decide to exit the market because, even after investment, they are not protable enough
to pay the xed production costs.
Similarly, the tractability condition implies that only those rms with operating prots
that counterweight the xed export costs fx, also paid in units of labor, will be able to
export. Again, this denes a marginal rm, x, whose export prots are zero: x (

x) = 0
rd (

x)

(1 + )1  = fx (16)
From this condition we can derive the export cuto¤ x: the threshold corresponding
to the minimum level of productivity which ensures just enough revenues to pay fx.
2.5 Aggregation
After applying trade balance condition for symmetric countries, the index price over the
support of  leads to:
P 1  =
Z 1

Np ()1 
g()
[1 G()]d (17)
+
Z 1
x
Nx [p () [1 +  ]]
1  g()
[1 G(x)]
d
From the left to the right, the integrals represent domestic and imported varieties,
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respectively. The assumption of symmetric countries implies that the characteristics of
imported varieties are identical to those of exported ones. Thus, the number of exporters
in both countries is the same Nhx = Nfx = Nx. The total number of varieties available for
consumption in a country is then NT = N +Nx: It is composed of N domestic varieties,
including exported and non-exported goods, and Nx imported varieties.
The price index P takes into account that prices are a function of the random variable
: Consequently, the domestic component considers the distribution of  conditional on
having entered the market g()
1 G() ; and the import component the one conditional on
having the export status g()
1 G(x) :
Trade balance accounting concerns two components: consumption goods and capi-
tal goods. The former are considered in the standard export-import balance accounting
between the two symmetric countries and the latter in the amortization of the initial
investment in capital, imported from the rest of the world and paid by revenues coming
from sales. Since both components are supplied and paid independently their accounting
can also be done independently. Hence, the index price takes only into account consump-
tion goods. Using the assumption of symmetry and the standard results of CES demand
formulation, one obtains directly the aboved-presented expression.
Plugging the optimal prices set by the rm into the price index we obtain:
P = 
 1
hR1

NA() 1g()
[1 G()] d+ (1 + )
1  R1
x
NxA() 1g()
[1 G(x)] d
i 1
1 
Dening fAd 1  R1 A() 1 g()[1 G()]g()d and fAx 1  R1x A() 1 g()[1 G(x)]d we
can express the average productivity and the price index as
fAT  1 = 1
NT
h
NfAd 1 +Nx (1 + )1 fAx 1i (18)
P = N
1
1 
T

  1
1fAT (19)
This is the Melitzs (2003) aggregate price summarized by the average productivityfAT : In our framework, productivity is determined by the optimal technology choice
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(14), which depends on the index price. This leads to an externality of investment.
Thanks to investment, the economy becomes more productive and the aggregate price
P is reduced. As in this Dixit-Stiglitz framework each rm competes with the whole
economy, the average productivity improvement induces rms to invest more in order
to set a competitive price. However, rms do not take into account that their behavior
determines the average productivity of the economy.
After plugging (19) into (14) and the result into (6) and (18); we obtain:
fAT = (; )
NT
b (20)
Where the following denitions apply:
(; )  R
 ()

  1


b 1  1
NT

N b 1d + [1 +  ]1 Nx b 1x  (21)
b 1d  1[1 G()]
Z 1


 1
 g()d
b 1x  1
[1 G(x)]
Z 1
x

 1
 g()d
The average dened by b aggregates heterogeneity after taking into account optimal
decisions of investment. Similarly, bd and bx are the domestic and export counterparts
of b. This average gives a measure of the reaction of labor productivity in the industry
to the technology choice.
Proposition 1: Firms investment is a function of its (exogenous) initial heterogeneity
 relative to the (endogenous) aggregate of the industry (b) : The investment function is
given by:
I () =
(; )
NT
hbi
 1

(22)
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Proof: Plugging the global average productivity (20) into the optimal investment (14)
gives (22). 
Equation (22) gives further insights concerning the above-mentioned externality of
investment. Since bd and bx are endogenously determined by productivity cuto¤s, b is
modied by rmsdecisions. Producers drawing a high initial productivity level will bias
the initial distribution since they will concentrate most of investment gains. This occurs
because rms anticipate the impact of their investment decisions on their demand. The
decision of high productive rms will deter the least productive ones to undertake a large
amount of investment because they compete with the average rm which has become more
productive. As a consequence, rmsdecisions are particularly sensitive to the expected
relative advantages. As the average productivity gains are reinforced, the e¤ectiveness of
investment is reduced for rms with a low . This induces the exit of the least productive
rms and as a consequence an increase in b:
Proposition 2: Global productivity fAT can be summarized as the productivity of a
representative rm which its initial productivity can be improved through the "investment
channel" by a factor of b : fAT = A(b): More generally, a rm with an initial level of
heterogeneity  will obtain after investment decision a productivity level of :
A () = I () = 
()
NT
hbi
 1

(23)
Proof: Substitution of (22) into rm productivity (6) leads to equation (23). Evalu-
ating (23) for  = b gives (20) 
The optimal investment denes prots and revenues as functions of the exogenous
initial productivity : Plugging (22) into (9) gives:
rd () =
1
NT
hbi
 1

R (24)
Export revenues and prots are pin down by rd () (see equations (10) and (12)). The
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industry can be aggregated using the weighted averages b; bd and bx: Average revenue er
(net of investment), steam from average revenues earned from domestic sales rId (bd) and
from export sales rx (bx)
er = rId (bd) + xrx (bx) (25)
A similar statement applies for average prots e, which can be decomposed into do-
mestic d (bd) and export x (bx) average prots.
e = d (bd) + xx (bx) (26)
Where the probability of exporting, x =
1 G(x)
1 G() is the probability of having an 
higher than the export cuto¤ x; conditional on having entered the market. Applying
(22), domestic revenues net of amortized investment rId () = rd ()   I0 () can be
expressed as:
rId () = rd () (27)
Hence, rId (bd) = rd (bd) :
2.6 Macro Balance
In this subsection we analyze global conditions of stability and macroeconomic balance
to close the model.
2.6.1 Entry-Exit
The rst group of conditions relates to the entry-exit process. The mass of prospective
entrants is unbounded, they decide to enter depending on the rms value and before
knowing their initial productivity level . Hence, in order to decide whether they enter
the market, rms calculate the expected value of the average prot ows ev = [1 G()]e

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and compare it to the sunk entry cost fe. As usual, rms enter the market until the
expected value of rms ev is equalized to the sunk entry cost. This equality (ev = fe) states
the free entry condition (FE):
e = fe
[1 G()] (FE)
Among rms that enter the market Ne, only a fraction  = 1   G() will decide to
stay. These rms are those whose technical conditions allow enough revenues to pay the
xed costs of production. On the other hand, among active rms N , some of them will
exit the market with an exogenous probability  (the death shock of Melitz, 2003). The
stability condition of entry and exit implies:
N = Ne (28)
2.6.2 Labor Market and Global Accounting
The labor factor is inelastically supplied in perfect competition. Total labor LT is com-
posed of production workers Lp (including labor used to pay the xed production and
export costs) and also workers allocated to pay the sunk cost to enter the market Le:
LT = Lp + Le (29)
The Ne rms that enter the market incur a labor cost of start-up equal to
Le = Nefe (30)
The labor market clearing condition is ensured by the global accounting condition.
Recalling that wage rate is normalized to 1:
Lp +Ne = R (31)
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Using (30), the free entry condition (FE) and the stability condition (??) one easily
obtains Le = Ne: Using (29) yields:
LT = R (32)
2.6.3 Number of Domestic Firms
Starting from the previous conditions we can express average revenues er as
er = R
N
(33)
We can write average prots as e = er

  f   xfx: After multiplying both sides by N
and rearranging terms, we obtain the aggregate revenue:
R = Ner = N [e + f + xfx] (34)
Replacing R in labor market clearing condition (32) and applying the free entry con-
dition (FE) one gets the number of active domestic rms:
N =
LTh
fe

+ f + xfx
i

(35)
After considering revenues net of investment, the expression dening the number of
rms looks similar to the standard Melitzs framework. However, the outcome is di¤erent.
In this model, the probabilities dened by  and x are determined by the cuto¤s 

x and
; which at equilibrium are inuenced by the endogenous investment decision.
2.7 Equilibrium
The equilibrium can be solved using the Free Entry condition (FE) once we have deter-
mined its left-hand-side: the average prots e. The latter can be related to the minimum
level of initial productivity that allows enough revenues to stay in the market (the pro-
duction cuto¤  dened by equation (15)). This relationship is what Melitz (2003) calls
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the Zero Cuto¤ Prot condition (ZCP). Hence, the equilibrium is jointly determined by
both the FE condition (FE) and the ZCP condition. The intersection of both curves,
gives  at equilibrium, which will then pin down the rest of endogenous variables of the
model.
Starting from equation (26) we need to derive the ZCP in order to express e as a
function of the cuto¤ : A convenient treatment is to exploit the aggregation properties
of the model. To obtain the domestic average prot in (26), we start from the domestic
average revenue (24). In order to simplify b; we express the ratio of the revenue of the
representative domestic rm bd over the one earned by the cuto¤ rm . Applying this
to equation (27) gives:
rId (bd) = bd
 1

rId (
)
From equation (15) we know that operating prots of the production cuto¤rm equals
the xed production cost: r
I
d(
)

= f: Hence, the domestic prots of the representative
domestic rm d (bd) = rId(bd)   f can be written now as a function of the production
cuto¤  and the average bd; which only depends on : This leads to:
d (bd) = (bd

 1

  1
)
f
In the case of the average export revenues we proceed in a similar way. This time, we
divide the export revenue of a representative exporter bx by the one earned by the export
cuto¤ rm x. We also know that the export operating prots of the export cuto¤ rm
equals the xed cost to reach the foreign market: rx(

x)

= fx: Then, export prots of the
representative exporter are give by:
x (bx) = (bx
x
 1

  1
)
fx
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Therefore, the ZCP condition denes the average prot per rm as:
e = (bd

 1

  1
)
f + x
(bx
x
 1

  1
)
fx (ZCP)
This condition is entirely determined by the production cuto¤ level. We know that
bd = bd () and bx = bx (x) : Thus, we just need to nd x = x (). In order to
nd this relationship, we plug the optimal investment (22) into equations (15) and (16).
Then, we take the ratio of the resulting equations and we nd:
x = 
 () (36)
If  ()  [1 +  ]
h
fx
f
i 
 1
> 1 there will be exported varieties at the equilibrium
( < x)
2: At the end, the ZCP condition depends only on  and the exogenous para-
meters. In order to get a closed solution we solve the model using a Pareto distribution
for the initial productivity draws.
3 Analytical solution
Following Ghironi and Melitz (2005) and Melitz and Ottaviano (2005), we parametrize
the productivity draws to get tractable solutions of the model.
Assumption 2: Productivity draws are distributed according to a Pareto distribution
g (') =
k'kmin
'k+1
with a lower bound 'min = 1 and a shape parameter k >
 1

.
When this shape parameter increases there is a reduction of the technological disper-
sion, which will be concentrated towards the lower bound. As usual, this distribution
density requires k >  1

in order to ensure nite means. The parameter min = 1 implies
that the corresponding cumulative distribution function is given by G() = 1   1

k
.
2This occurs when fx ( 2  ) (1 + ) 1 > f
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We can easily verify that  = 1   G() =  k and x = 1 G(

x)
1 G() =
h

x
ik
: After
solving the integrals dening bd; bx we obtain:
bd =  (37)
bx = x (38)
Where  
h
 k
 1 k
i  1
Proposition 3: Under Assumption 2, there exists a unique equilibrium production
cuto¤  determined by the ZCP and FE conditions. This cuto¤ is given by:
 =
24
h

 1
   1
i h
f + fx ()
 k
i
fe
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1
k
(39)
Proof. Equalizing the equations of average prot stated by the ZPC and the FE
leads to the equilibrium production cuto¤ (39). 
Proposition 4: Under assumption 2, the production cuto¤ is a decreasing function
of variable trade costs
 
@
@
< 0

:
Proof. From (39) we obtain: @

@
=  1 k


 1
  1

fe
 fx ()
 k
[1+ ]
. Since  > 0, as long
as 
 1
 > 1; we verify @

@
< 0. Note that 
 1
 = 1
1  1
k [
 1
 ]
. Thus, if k >  1

; clearly

 1
 > 1 . This is exactly what the condition restricting k states in order to get nite
means.
Melitz (2003) explains this result as a general equilibrium consequence of the increase
in the number of potential entrants. After a reduction of variable trade costs, export
demand increases. The value of rms is higher in the new equilibrium, which implies a
higher number of entrants. This in turn increases labor demands and also real wages 1
P
.
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To be able to pay the xed production cost, the marginal rm needs to be more productive
than before.
In our model, the reduction of variable trade costs also enhances investment demand.
As we saw, investment is more signicant when the initial heterogeneity induces higher
productivity gains from technology. The externality of investment reinforces the selec-
tion process. After a reduction of trade costs, investment remains low for initially-low-
productive rms. Consequently, they end-up with a lower productivity relative to the
economy. Therefore, these rms will be forced to exit the market after a reduction of
trade frictions.
Proposition 5: Under assumption 2, the export cuto¤ is an increasing function of
variable trade costs:

@x
@
> 0

:
Proof. Applying (39) to the export cuto¤ equation (36) gives the cuto¤ x which
veries: @

x
@
= 
h
@
@
+ 

(1+)
i
: Since @

@
< 0; we need to prove
@
@
 <  (1+) ,  @@ <

(1+)
: After using @

@
obtained in the proof of proposition 4, this condition is similar to
state 1h
f
fx k
+1
i < 1. Since f
fx k > 0 , this proposition is unambiguously veried.
Since productivity A () increases monotonically with , a reduction of variable trade
costs will decrease the export cuto¤ productivity level. Hence, more rms are able to
acquire the export status. On the demand side, variable trade costs reduction leads to
a decrease in the price of home goods sold in the foreign market. This price reduction
accounts for an increase in foreign demand, which in turn raises export prots. In this
new equilibrium rms need a lower level of productivity to pay the xed export costs and
to sell in the foreign market.
Note that these properties

@
@
< 0; @

x
@
> 0

imply directly that higher variable trade
costs increases the ex-ante probability of staying in the market
 
@
@
> 0

and reduces the
probability of exporting

@x
@
< 0

. Intuitively, if the reduction of trade costs increases
the minimum level of productivity required to stay in the market, the probability of a
successful entry is reduced. Similarly, if less costly trade induces a lower threshold of
productivity to export, it also implies a higher probability to reach the foreign market.
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4 The reduction of trade variable costs
4.1 Within-rm productivity
The standard results presented in the previous section are reinforced by the investment
channel introduced in this model. The impact of trade liberalization can be separated
into two channels whether one observes the supply or the demand e¤ects of trade variable
costs. The former is related to the reduction of the cost of capital equipment, while
the latter is based on the anticipation of an increase in nal goods and factor demands
which induces capital-labor substitution. In this section we analyze these channels in
more detail.
Consider rm productivity at equilibrium. Investment (22) applied to productivity
(23), after global accounting states:
A () = 

  1

 
LT
NT ()

 ()
 
b ()
 1

(40)
NT () highlights the dependency of the number of varieties on trade costs. The latter
a¤ects the probabilities of staying in the market and of exporting (see equation (35)).
Applying the aggregation of heterogeneity for domestic (37) and exported (38) varieties
to the global one (21) gives b as function of  : The reason is that this aggregation depends
on the cuto¤s of production and export, which are in turn determined by  :
On the supply side, the e¤ect of trade costs on the nal capital price is captured by
the nal price of imported capital in home currency  () = (1 + ) pkew. Clearly A ()
increases when  decreases and its impact (in absolute value) is higher for high values of
initial productivity gains . On the demand side, foreign consumption increases after a
reduction of variable trade costs. The intuition is that rms anticipate a greater demand
and, as a consequence, more requirement of labor. Hence, labor productivity gains become
more protable, which leads to a raise in investment demand. While the supply channel is
homogeneous across rms, the demand channel depends on . Thus, the latter generates
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heterogeneous rmsproductivity improvements.
We nd these results with the help of numerical simulations. The parameters used
are: fe = 15;  = 10%; fx = 20; f = 1;  = 1;  = 2=3; k = 4: This setting veries both
k >  1

and the following condition  ()  [1 +  ]
h
fx
f
i 
 1
> 1, ensuring exported
varieties at equilibrium.
Result 1: Firm productivity increases with the reduction of trade variable costs  .
The impact of  on productivity gains is non-linear and it is more signicant when  is
higher.
We illustrate this mechanism in Figure 2. It shows the plot of A () on  for a high
( = 2) and a low ( = 1) levels of initial draws. In both cases a reduction of variable
trade costs enhances labor productivity, but this improvement depends positively on the
initial productivity level. Moreover, in the graph one clearly observes a steeper slope for
the higher .
Figure 2
More interestingly, there is a change in the distribution of initial productivity levels.
This result is illustrated in Figure 3. We plot both the initial productivity draws (dashed
line) and the equilibirum-level of productivity after investment (solid line). Firms can de-
cide to modify their initial productivity level by the means of technological investments,
but these decisions depend on their initial protability. Thus, technological improvements
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are biased towards initially high-productive rms. In an heterogeneous rms model with
xed-exogenous productivity draws, the levels of rm productivity will be simply rep-
resented by : This is the 45 dashed line3. The heterogeneous e¤ect of investment is
captured by the concavity of the productivity level at equilibrium (solid line). It might be
the case that, as in Figure 3, the productivity level is even reduced. The xed-exogenous
productivity model can be seen as a model in which initial investment is homogenous and
normalized to 1. Allowing for a continuous technology choice with investment external-
ities reinforces the e¤ect of market selection. Firms drawing a low  will be deterred to
undertake a signicant level of investment.
Figure 3
4.2 The intensive and the extensive margin of trade
One implication of the previous results is that trade liberalization, in countries highly
dependant on imported technologies, improves mainly the volume of exports of initially
high-productive rms. Namely those that already export before trade reform (intensive
margin). Foreign demand (3), using the properties of aggregation eAT = A(b ()), can be
expressed at equilibrium as:
3Scales of axis are assymetric.
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df = 

  1


b ()
 1
 LT
NT ()
(1 + ) A(b ())
We know that a fall of trade variable costs forces the least productive rms to exit the
market. Thus, the average b () increases. We observe again di¤erentiated e¤ects of trade
policy depending on the impact of foreign technology on labor productivity. A reduction
of variable trade costs induces a positive income e¤ect through an increase in the average
productivity of the economy, which boosts up global consumption. However, the demand
of each rm (in monopolistic competition) depends on their technology relative to the
average of the economy

the by b()

, the latter being endogenously determined. The
initially high-productive rms will become even more e¢ cient after trade liberalization
and thereby they will enlarge their export demand.
Result 2: A reduction of trade barriers has a higher impact on the intensive margin
of trade (volume of exports) relative to the extensive one (number of new exporters).
To illustrate this point, we simulate the relationship between foreign demand and
initial productivity of rms, for two di¤erent levels of variable trade costs. Figure 4 plots
foreign demand df () on . In the plot, the economy changes from a iceberg cost level
of 80% (solid line) to a one of 20% (dashed line). Foreign demand curve increases more
for high levels of , where the slope is steeper.
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τ1=80%
τ2=20%
α*x(τ 2)α*x(τ1)
Ext.
Margin
Int.
Margin
Figure 4.
While there is a huge increase in the intensive margin of trade, there is only a minor
one in the extensive margin. Indeed, the reduction of the export threshold x is small.
It will only allow for few rms to become exporters. Therefore, gains from trade are
concentrated on continuing exporters.
5 Conclusion
This paper addresses the impact of trade on the evolution of within rm productivity gains
in countries highly dependant on technologies embodied in imported capital equipment
goods. We proposed an intra-industry trade model of heterogeneous rms which are able
to change their initial e¢ ciency level. The main contribution of this study is to introduce
endogenous productivity gains determined by an initial investment in foreign technology.
The model proposed in this paper introduces several results consistent with the em-
pirical ndings of rm-level studies. Firstly, trade liberalization induces a protability
bias towards the initially more productive rms. These rms are able to improve easily
their e¢ ciency by foreign technology adoption after a reduction of trade variable costs.
Secondly, contrary to the standard vision that supports the idea of a tari¤s reduction
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in order to foster export diversication, this work argues that, in the case of a country
highly dependant on foreign technology, trade variable costs reduction will have a minor
impact on the extensive margin of trade.
Finally, the model is able to reproduce two important channels through which trade
liberalization a¤ects aggregate productivity growth. Besides the standard mechanism of
selection and reallocation of resources (between- rm channel), the model also reproduces
aggregate productivity gains related to improvements inside the rm (within-rm).
Further research should be oriented to analyze the specic pattern of the distribution
of productivity levels at equilibrium and to compare it to rm level data. This can be
made by the means of stochastic simulation. It seems clear for us that the link between
trade and productivity asks for further research on stochastic dynamic issues.
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